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Abstract 
Fibre deployment of next-generation high-speed broadband networks is considered to be a decisive 
development for any information-based society, yet investment activities and especially the adoption 
of fibre-based broadband services take place only very gradually in most countries. This work employs 
static and dynamic model specifications and identifies the most important determinants of the adoption 
of fibre-based broadband services with recent panel data from the European Union member states for 
the years from 2004 to 2012.  
The results show that the more effective previous broadband access regulation is, the more negative 
the impact on adoption, while competitive pressure from mobile networks affects adoption in a non-
linear manner. It appears that the approach of strict cost-based access regulation embedded in the EU 
regulatory framework is at odds with the targets outlined in the European Commission’s “Digital 
Agenda”. Finally, we also find evidence for substantial network effects underlying the adoption 
process.
[1] 
1 Introduction 
The traditional (“first-generation” copper- or coax-based) broadband networks appear to be outdated 
and it has become necessary to speed up these networks in recent years to account for the growing 
demand for bandwidth/connection speed. According to “Nielsen’s law”, the broadband connection 
speed increases every year by 50% (FTTH Council Europe 2012, p. 12). Next-generation fibre-based 
access (NGA) networks deployed on the ground provide much more bandwidth capacity. As these 
networks represent a general purpose technology, they are expected to induce significant productivity 
improvements and growth across major economic sectors such as health, electricity and transport (e.g. 
Czernich et al. 2011).
 
However, substituting the traditional infrastructure with fibre-optic networks 
also involves high risks and massive investment volumes.
1
  
The demand in terms of adoption (penetration) and supply-side activities in terms of investment in 
fibre-based network infrastructure (coverage) vary significantly in an international comparison. Most 
European countries lag far behind the leading Asian fibre nations (such as Japan, Korea, Taiwan and 
Hong Kong), but also behind the development in the US (Briglauer and Gugler 2013). As regards 
NGA adoption within Europe, Northern and Eastern European economies are leading by a large 
margin with NGA household adoption levels between ~10% (Denmark and Latvia) and ~26% 
(Lithuania) at the end of 2011. Exceptional cases are Belgium and Luxembourg, where the focus on 
less expensive NGA deployment technologies has facilitated adoption levels of ~45% and ~85%, 
respectively. However, most of the other European countries still show NGA adoption levels (far) 
below 5%, including all the major Western and Southern European economies.
2
  
Europe’s gap in NGA deployment was recognized by the European Commission (EC) and explicitly 
addressed in its “Digital Agenda”, which specifies goals in terms of high-speed broadband coverage 
                                                     
1
 The total investments in nationwide NGA deployment (coverage) depend inter alia on the network topology 
employed and the targeted coverage levels and amount to billions of euros (wik consult 2008).  
2
  See Figure A.1 in the Annex, which reports time-series plots for high- and low-cost NGA deployment 
scenarios for the EU27 countries. 
[2] 
and penetration.
3
 In achieving these goals, one of the most controversial regulatory issues in Europe 
(and elsewhere) is whether the emerging NGA infrastructure should be subjected to sector-specific ex 
ante access regulation. Former – mostly state-owned – telecommunications monopolists 
(“incumbents”) argue that sector-specific ex ante regulation would be detrimental to dynamic 
efficiency in terms of investment incentives and infrastructure innovation. Instead, it would be 
sufficient to rely on market mechanisms and infrastructure-based competition in particular. 
Conversely, alternative operators that are dependent on access regulation (“service-based competitors” 
or “entrants”) as well as some national regulatory authorities (NRAs) fear the rise of NGA networks as 
another upcoming monopolistic infrastructure and that incumbent firms or other alternative NGA 
infrastructure operators would gain an essential and long-lasting competitive (“first-mover”) 
advantage, which implies the need to have appropriate ex ante regulation in place. Regulatory-induced 
service-based competition would also have an immediate effect on static efficiency in terms of lower 
prices and hence on the adoption of (new) communications technologies on the demand side. 
Based on an unbalanced panel of the EU27 member states for the years from 2004 to 2012, this paper 
addresses the following research questions: (i) What is the impact of broadband access regulations on 
NGA adoption? (ii) How does infrastructure-based competition stemming from wireless (mobile) 
networks influence the extent of NGA adoption? (iii) To what extent is NGA adoption driven by 
diffusion dynamics such as network effects or consumer inertia? This paper represents the first attempt 
to quantify econometrically the determinants of NGA adoption with recent EU27 country-level data. A 
multiplicity of static and dynamic model specifications and a broad set of control variables serve as 
important robustness checks. Furthermore, we argue that there is no endogeneity problem in terms of 
reverse causality in the empirical specification, which relates first-generation broadband demand- and 
supply-side factors to second-generation NGA markets and services.  
                                                     
3
  The Digital Agenda “seeks to ensure that, by 2020, (i) all Europeans have access to much higher internet 
speeds of above 30 Mbps and (ii) 50% or more of European households subscribe to internet connections 
above 100 Mbps” (European Commission 2010a, p. 19). Whereas the target in (i) refers to a coverage level 
of 100%, the target in (ii) is related to a minimum household adoption level subject to quality characteristics 
that can be realized only with NGA technologies.  
[3] 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. First, we review the recent and most relevant 
contributions in the empirical literature in section 2. Section 3 briefly provides the necessary 
background information on the technical context of NGA networks. Section 4 then describes basic 
hypotheses concerning the role of sector-specific regulation and competition as well as the other main 
cost and demand factors. Section 5 describes our data set. Section 6 presents the empirical 
specification and the underlying identification strategy. Section 7 discusses the main empirical results. 
To conclude, section 8 summarizes and contains some final remarks.  
2 Empirical evidence 
The empirical literature related to the impact of broadband access regulations and competition can be 
divided into three broad categories: (i) quantitative analysis focusing on the impact on investment; (ii) 
quantitative analysis focusing on the impact on adoption (penetration); and (iii) qualitative analysis 
with a focus on penetration or investment. The latter appears to be most meritorious in the case of too 
few observations in which quantitative analysis cannot provide reliable guidance. However, we think 
that the availability of NGA-related data is sufficient now to allow robust statistical analysis. 
Accordingly, in this section we focus on quantitative studies only and do not review the literature 
related to qualitative studies.
4
 When reviewing the quantitative literature, one has to be aware of the 
heavily interest-driven nature of the discussion and of the fact that a large number of contributions 
represent directly industry-sponsored work. Therefore, our literature review also excludes industry-
sponsored work that has not been published in peer-reviewed academic journals.  
Regarding the impact of regulation on investment (i), Jung et al. (2008), who use US data for the years 
from 1997 to 2002, find that infrastructure competition increases the investment incentives while 
mandatory access obligations at best have a weak effect on the investment of infrastructure operators. 
Recent work with data from EU countries exhibits similar results: Grajek and Röller (2011) investigate 
the relationship between regulation and total investment in the telecommunications industry. Their 
study is among the few that explicitly account for the endogeneity problem of regulation and 
                                                     
4
  A comprehensive overview of qualitative studies can be found in Berkman Center (2010, pp. 121–136). Our 
review also excludes a number of recent quantitative studies in which the data are based on surveys (e.g. 
Sunada et al. 2011) and that do not consider inter alia the role of regulation and competition. 
[4] 
investment. Investment is quantified therein rather broadly by the tangible fixed assets of 
telecommunications operators and, thus, does not explicitly refer to broadband or NGA deployment. 
Wallsten and Hausladen (2009) are the first to estimate the effects of broadband access regulation on 
NGA deployment. They find that countries where broadband access regulation is more effective 
experience lower fibre deployment. However, they use data for the years from 2002 to 2007, which 
only cover the NGA roll-out in its very early stage and the authors do not capture the investment 
dynamics. Briglauer et al. (2013) investigate the determinants and dynamics of NGA investment with 
for yearly data from 2005 to 2011. They find that stricter previous broadband access regulation has a 
negative impact on NGA deployment, while competitive pressure from cable and mobile networks 
affects NGA deployment in a non-linear manner.  
Regarding the literature on the impact of regulation on adoption (ii), there are several contributions 
related to broadband markets, but no NGA-related studies. Using US data from 2001 to 2004, Denni 
and Gruber (2007) find that infrastructure-based competition has a positive impact on broadband 
diffusion in the longer term, whereas regulatory-induced service-based competition has a positive 
impact only if the number of service-based entrants is not too large. Non-US-based work mainly refers 
to OECD country-level data. Bouckaert et al. (2010) examine the determinants of broadband 
penetration for the years from 2003 to 2008. They find that infrastructure-based competition has a 
positive impact on broadband penetration, whereas service-based competition is an impediment to 
penetration. Lee et al. (2011) analyse the determinants of broadband diffusion for the years from 2000 
to 2008. With respect to unbundling obligations, the authors find a positive and significant effect on 
the speed of diffusion. They admit, however, that unbundling might have a negative impact on long-
term investment and the broadband saturation level. Cava-Ferreruela and Alabau-Munoz (2006) find 
that infrastructure-based competition has a significant and positive impact on broadband penetration, 
whereas unbundling has no significant effect for data from 2000 to 2002. Finally, some contributions 
refer to data from European countries. Distaso et al. (2006) analyse EU-related data from 2001 to 2004 
and find that infrastructure-based competition is the main driver of broadband take-up and plays a 
more important role than service-based competition, especially in the longer term. Höffler (2007) 
examines data for sixteen Western European countries for the years from 2000 to 2004. He concludes 
[5] 
that broadband deployment was predominantly triggered by infrastructure-based competition, with 
service-based competition playing a secondary role.  
Summarizing, the majority of the empirical literature suggests that infrastructure-based competition 
has a positive impact on both investment and penetration. In turn, the evidence regarding service-
based competition relying on broadband access regulations tends to be negatively related to 
investment activities, while the impact on broadband adoption seems to be less clear. To the best of the 
author’s knowledge, there is no empirical work that examines the impact of regulation and competition 
on NGA adoption. This paper intends to fill this gap. 
3 Industry background 
Historically, first-generation networks of incumbent operators deployed twisted copper-wire pairs to 
overcome the last mile (“local loop”) to the subscriber in order to provide narrow bandwidth voice 
telephony services (POTS/ISDN) only. Many decades later, they were made capable of supporting 
broadband services by means of digital subscriber line (DSL) transmission technology. However, due 
to technical reasons, the bandwidth of DSL technologies is limited. In order to realize the NGA 
characteristic bandwidth, it is necessary to shorten the length of the copper-based local loops by 
placing the DSL transmission equipment closer to the retail customers’ premises, e.g. in the cabinets 
that house distribution frames (“fibre to the cabinet” – FTTC). In the remaining copper-wire line of the 
last mile, the latest DSL transmission technology is used. This solution can provide bandwidths of 20 
Mbit/s to 100 Mbit/s. In addition to upgrading first-generation copper-wire (DSL) networks in the 
local loop, the roll-out of high-speed communications networks might also be realized by upgrading 
cable (coax) television networks, which is referred to as “fibre to the last amplifer”, which provides 
bandwidths up to 150 Mbit/s. Similar or even higher bandwidths (above 100/150 Mbit/s) can be 
achieved if optical fibre is extended to or into the building (“fibre to the building” – FTTB). Only the 
remaining wiring inside the building relies on conventional copper wires. If the optical line is directly 
connected to the individual home (“fibre to the home” – FTTH), this would be the most future-proof 
technological solution, as it enables nearly unlimited bandwidth (RTR 2010, pp. 189–191; Briglauer 
2012, pp. 2-3).  
[6] 
FTTx stands for a family of technologies that includes all the NGA scenarios described above. As 
such, it differs from a more narrow definition that refers to cost-intensive FTTH/B technologies.
5
  
During the relevant analysis period (2004 to 2012), mobile broadband access has already been 
facilitated by 3G+ technologies (GPRS, EDGE, UMTS and HSDPA). Moreover, the industry expects 
long-term evolution (LTE) to enable transmission rates similar to wireline NGA (FTTx) scenarios in 
the near future. However, LTE is still in the test phase and the aforementioned mobile broadband 
standards are far from achieving FTTx-specific bandwidth levels. Therefore, mobile broadband is not 
considered to be a relevant (second-generation) NGA technology in the empirical analysis. 
4 Hypotheses 
From the empirical literature, one can infer that there is a common understanding that both demand-
side and supply-side factors have an influence on the adoption of fibre-based broadband services. 
Furthermore, most studies implicitly refer to a direct and positive relationship between investment 
(coverage) and adoption (penetration). Clearly, network coverage is a pre-condition for the successful 
adoption of NGA services and therefore the higher the available infrastructure stock, the higher the 
potential subscriber base (Wallsten and Hausladen 2009; Bouckaert et al. 2010).
6
 This section 
identifies the determinants of NGA investment and adoption and sets out corresponding hypotheses, 
which are aligned with the underlying research questions. Sections 4.1 and 4.2 focus on regulation and 
competition as the main explanatory variables that directly impact on the supply side, i.e. NGA 
investment. Likewise, cost conditions will shift the supply curve but also exert an indirect impact on 
NGA adoption (section 4.3). Finally, the adoption process will be directly influenced by diverse 
demand-side factors and network effects (section 4.4). However, the demand will also be related to 
regulation and competition, which affect prices and quality and thus indirectly the adoption of NGA 
services.  
                                                     
5
  Because the length of FTTH/B lines is longer compared with other FTTx technologies and thus services a 
much smaller customer base in the local loop, the average investment per FTTH/B connection is 
disproportionately higher (wik consult, 2008). 
6
  In our panel data set, Pearson’s bivariate correlation coefficients for FTTx coverage and FTTx adoption are 
0.7014 and 0.6982 in terms of connections per household and per capita, respectively.  
[7] 
4.1 Regulation 
NGA regulations will be defined and imposed by NRAs only in future decisions or, if already 
implemented, the effectiveness of these decisions still remains to be seen (Cullen International 2011, 
Tables 4, 9 and 10). It can be argued, however, that past regulation in first-generation broadband 
markets has clearly shaped the expectations for NGA regulations. This has been recently confirmed in 
NGA-relevant recommendations of the EC as well as in previous court decisions.
7
 In EU member 
states basically three kinds of ex ante (cost-based) access regulations are imposed on first-generation 
broadband markets since the beginning of market liberalization in 1997/1998: (i) alternative operators 
can rent the local loop from the incumbent operator (“unbundling”). (ii) service-based entrants may 
also offer retail broadband services by purchasing “bitstream” as a wholesale input from the 
incumbent operator but at a more service-based level of the value chain. Finally, (iii) “resale” means 
that access-seeking service providers receive and resell a wholesale input of the incumbent operator 
with virtually no scope for technological product differentiation (RTR 2010, pp. 176, 179). 
On the one hand, stricter wholesale access regulations increase service-based competition at the retail 
level in terms of lower broadband prices, exerting a positive impact on the demand side.
8
 On the other 
hand, tight regulation of existing broadband access infrastructure most likely, as mentioned above, 
creates corresponding expectations about the future regulation of NGA access infrastructure that 
decrease the investment incentives of (potential) infrastructure operators for the following: (i) 
imposing cost-oriented access prices for bottleneck inputs typically reduces profits or precludes excess 
profits of the regulated firm, which results in asymmetric distribution of the expected profits and, 
therefore, in a lower net present value of investment projects (Valetti 2003). Furthermore, access 
                                                     
7
  The NGA recommendation of the European Commission (2010b) as well as former draft versions clearly 
indicate that the EC is very much determined to extend its cost-based regulatory approach to the emerging 
NGA communications infrastructure. The reader is also referred to the earlier decision of the German 
Government to exempt the incumbent operator (Deutsche Telekom AG) from wholesale access obligations 
to its new infrastructure (FTTC) network (“regulatory holidays”). The EC, however, took Germany to court 
over this legal provision in 2007, which finally decided against it in 2009 (C-424/07).  
8
  Lower first-generation broadband prices do not necessarily imply higher levels of adoption of second-
generation NGA services. Section 5.2.3 outlines the potential impact of broadband prices in more detail as 
well as our underlying hypotheses. 
[8] 
regulation typically ignores (ii) the opportunity costs of real options (Guthrie 2009) and the fact that 
(iii) risks were distributed asymmetrically among regulated incumbent and entrant operators. 
Therefore, (iv) regulation reduces not only the investment incentives of regulated infrastructure 
operators but also those of potential entrant infrastructure operators who benefit from a risk-free 
option due to mandatory access obligations asymmetrically imposed on the incumbent operator 
(Pindyck 2007). Finally, pending decisions on NGA regulations have already led to substantial 
regulatory uncertainty, which constitutes another investment impediment. According to Nitsche and 
Wiethaus (2011), who model the effects of different regulatory regimes on NGA investment, a regime 
of less intense access regulations or regulatory holidays would have the most positive effects on 
investment, whereas the EU standard of strict cost-based access regulation turns out to be inferior.
9
 
Summarizing, we expect that ex ante sector-specific regulation in the form of mandatory access 
regimes has a negative impact on NGA investment and hence indirectly also on the adoption of NGA 
services. Higher levels of regulatory-induced service-based competition, however, might also have an 
opposite effect via lowering prices, which would increase demand and NGA adoption. 
4.2 Competition 
Telecommunications, by all means, have become one of the most dynamic and competitive industries 
since the beginning of the EU liberalization process. Likewise, recent and future investment in NGA is 
driven by infrastructure-based competition, most notably from mobile networks (“intermodal”), which 
“threaten” first-generation (copper and cable) networks and services. The so-called phenomenon of 
fixed-to-mobile substitution has already been quite intense with respect to narrowband voice telephony 
services at the beginning of NGA deployment (around 2005) and has become increasingly important 
until now, not only regarding voice telephony but also more and more to broadband services.
10
  
                                                     
9
  See also Briglauer and Gugler (2013), who evaluate NGA deployment and adoption in different 
geographical areas (Asia, the EU and the US) in view of the underlying regulatory approaches with a 
particular focus on the investment incentives embedded in the current EU regulatory framework.  
10
  The average EU mobile broadband penetration of all users (PCs/laptops and handheld devices) is about 41%, 
whereas the EU average fixed broadband penetration is 27.7% (including basic and high-speed connections) 
as of January 2012. Regarding the number of subscribers, fixed-to-mobile substitution is even more 
pronounced: whereas the average EU number of mobile subscribers increased constantly up to 127% by the 
[9] 
With respect to the potential impact of intermodal competition on NGA investment, one first has to 
distinguish the following opposing effects (Aghion et al. 2005): On the one hand, competitive markets 
bear incentives for innovative investment in view of temporary market power rents that can be 
captured (the “escape competition effect”), leading to a positive relation between intermodal 
competition and NGA investment. Indeed, the deployment of NGA networks can be seen as the “last 
chance” for traditional wireline infrastructure operators to escape successfully from broadband 
competition stemming from mobile networks with innovative and high-bandwidth-demanding NGA 
services that cannot be realized by means of mobile broadband technologies in the foreseeable future. 
On the other hand, intense intermodal competition in terms of pronounced fixed-to-mobile substitution 
will eventually reduce the potential rents and, thus, increasingly counteract NGA investment because 
operators will no longer be able to appropriate the necessary profits from NGA investment (the 
“Schumpeterian” effect).  
Second, one has to consider the “replacement effect” (Arrow 1962), according to which new NGA 
investment would “cannibalize” quasi-monopolistic profits from old first-generation infrastructure 
services, increasing the opportunity costs and thus reducing the incentive to invest.
11
 The replacement 
effect appears to be of practical relevance, as most EU27 member states have well-established first-
generation infrastructure in view of both network coverage and recent and foreseeable advances in 
wireline DSL/cable technology standards. As a result, conventional broadband services enjoy broad 
consumer acceptance in most EU member states, which also establishes non-negligible switching costs 
on the consumers’ side and hinders migration to the new technology unless its incremental benefits are 
large and transparent enough for consumers (Grajek and Kretschmer 2009, p. 241). 
In summary, we expect a non-linear relationship between NGA investment and the intensity of 
infrastructure-based (intermodal) competition from mobile networks. An increase in the intensity of 
intermodal competition might have – in the same manner as regulatory-induced service-based 
                                                                                                                                                                      
end of 2011, the average number of fixed-line connections has decreased significantly in recent years. All 
the data are available from the EC’s Digital Agenda Scoreboard website: http://ec.europa.eu/digital-
agenda/en/scoreboard.  
11
  See Bourreau et al. (2010) for a more general description of the replacement effect in the communications 
industry. 
[10] 
competition – a positive impact on the adoption of NGA services, i.e. on the demand side, as 
infrastructure-based competition enhances services
12
 and reduces the average broadband price level. 
With respect to the replacement effect, we expect that a higher diffusion of first-generation broadband 
(intramodal) connections leads to a lower adoption rate of second-generation NGA services. 
4.3 Cost factors  
The civil engineering and construction costs related to digging represent by far the most relevant cost 
drivers for NGA deployment. As these cost factors are largely fixed and sunk costs, one can expect 
that the average deployment costs will decrease with the number of broadband/NGA subscribers 
(“economies of density”; wik consult 2008). Furthermore, these deployment costs will crucially 
depend on largely time-invariant topographic and demographic characteristics, such as urbanization, 
population or household density and housing structure, in particular, the number of multi-dwelling 
units (FTTH Council Europe 2012, pp. 24–25). 
Relevant legal and institutional factors, such as regulations on capital costs, rights of way and digging 
or other allowances and technical standards, local availability and reusability of ducts and dark fibre or 
NGA-specific state aid policies, also show hardly any variation with respect to the relevant time frame.  
4.4 Demand factors 
The demand depends on the average price for high-speed broadband services, the overall market size 
in terms of total communications expenditure and consumer wealth in general. Consumers with higher 
average communications expenditures can be regarded as having greater affinity with information and 
communications technologies (ICT), which might result in higher levels of NGA adoption (FTTH 
Council Europe 2012, p. 42). The demand for NGA services is also driven by a variety of consumer 
preferences, referring to the overall affinity with ICT, conventional Internet usage and usage intensity 
of high-speed broadband services. Consumers’ needs are furthermore determined by their average 
education levels, since higher levels of education improve e-literacy skills, which considerably 
                                                     
12
  Whereas the main merits of regulation and service-based competition refer to lower prices, including pricing 
innovations and customer care, infrastructure-based competition also has the technical potential to enhance 
services via quality innovation. 
[11] 
increases the utility derived from NGA technologies. Also, more highly educated people tend to be 
more prone to adopting and experimenting with new ICT (Kiiski and Pohjola 2002, p. 302).  
Finally, one has to consider network effects as a special type of externality underlying the NGA 
adoption process, in case the number of subscribers (and/or producers) has an impact on the 
consumers’ utility (firms’ profit) (Shy 2010). In general, increases in the adoption rates also lead to 
increases in the usage intensity of the respective services (Grajek and Kretschmer 2009, p. 240). 
Consumers’ utility can be related to the possibility of communicating with one another at the consumer 
level either directly, e.g. via different “Web 2.0” platforms, or indirectly, in the case of network effects 
occuring at different producer levels. For instance, the more users subscribe to (high-speed) Internet 
services, the more specific content and related applications will be programmed, which increases the 
consumers’ utility and willingness to adopt such (NGA) services. The same is true for the development 
of related hardware and electronic equipment. Furthermore, it is likely that the NGA adoption process 
is subject to learning spillovers, inasmuch as the value added of NGA services appears to be a priori 
unknown to potential consumers, whose valuation inter alia depends on the information gathered by 
the already-existing subscriber base (Grajek 2010, p. 133). Operators simply benefit from the network 
size, since an increase in the total number of subscribers lowers the average costs significantly in view 
of the NGA network topology and thus increases the profits.  
All the network effects described above give rise to a self-propelling endogenous growth process, 
which suggests that the contemporaneous and previous NGA adoption rates are positively related: the 
higher the existing subscriber base, the higher the potential network benefits.  
5 Data and variables 
The empirical specification is based on the following data sources. The “EU Progress Report” 
provides yearly data for all the relevant wholesale broadband access regulations. Our second main 
source is the database of FTTH Council Europe, which includes the annual numbers of connected 
NGA lines for all the EU27 member states. EUROSTAT/COCOM provides data on the total 
population, education, Internet usage and ICT labour costs as well as the housing structure. We use the 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) data to measure intermodal infrastructure competition 
[12] 
and Quantum-Web tariff data as a representative measure of the average broadband price that is related 
to the first-generation infrastructure. Finally, data from the World Bank provide us with the GDP per 
capita, the European Intelligence Unit (EIU) with measures of labour and wage costs and the 
percentage of people living in urban areas and EUROMONITOR with telecommunications revenues 
and the number of households and Internet users.  
As the data availability differs by variable, we use an unbalanced panel data set of EU27 countries for 
the time range from 2004 to 2011 for yearly data on our independent variables and from 2005 to 2012 
for yearly data on our dependent variable. All the variable definitions, expected signs and sources as 
well as summary statistics are listed in detail in the Annex in Tables A.1 and A.2, respectively. 
5.1 Dependent variable 
The dependent variable, FTTx_hh, measures adoption as the actual number of NGA connections 
divided by a country’s total number of households.13 In line with the description in section 3, the 
relevant wireline NGA/FTTx technologies include FTTH/B/C and fibre to the last amplifier. The 
dependent variable represents the number of households exhibiting sufficient willingness to pay and 
actively using one of the FTTx-based (NGA) services under a commercial contract.  
5.2 Independent variables 
The independent variables can be divided into the following categories: (i) regulation, (ii) 
infrastructure-based competition, (iii) prices and (iv) cost and demand controls.  
5.2.1 Regulation 
The regulation variable, reg_bb, measures the lines actively used by service-based competitors as the 
share of the total regulated wholesale broadband lines (including unbundling, bitstream and resale) 
related to the total retail broadband lines. Therefore, this variable not only includes all the relevant 
                                                     
13
  The other metric commonly used refers to per capita terms. Both measures have their strengths and 
weaknesses. Adoption in per capita terms refers to both business and residential users, whereas household 
penetration omits business customers. However, household subscription data seem to be the more correct 
measure as fixed-wireline (NGA) connections are typically related to a single household but not to an 
individual subscriber (as is the case for wireless subscriptions). Hence, we prefer household data, but – as it 
will be shown – the estimates are robust to the alternative specification in per capita terms. 
[13] 
wholesale broadband access regulations as outlined in section 4.1, but also provides an immediate 
measure of their effectiveness.
14
 We expect a negative sign of reg_bb, as we also control for the 
opposed price effect of service-based competition (section 5.2.3)  
Furthermore, we argue that access regulations, reg_bb, imposed on the “old” network infrastructure 
typically many years ago, are exogenous with respect to the deployment of the “new” NGA 
infrastructure and the adoption of NGA services. At the same time, previous regulation on broadband 
markets is a rather reasonable – and in fact the best – proxy for (expected) NGA regulation, inasmuch 
as reg_bb represents the most relevant remedial measures within the EU regulatory framework.  
5.2.2 Competition 
The main form of infrastructure-based competition related to first-generation infrastructure services 
stems from mobile networks. The variable fms states the share of fixed landlines in the total number of 
fixed landlines and mobile subscriptions and hence expresses the extent of fixed-to-mobile 
substitution, fms, in a country. This variable is expected to exhibit a non-linear relationship and its net 
impact depends on the relative importance of the escape competition and Schumpeterian effect.  
bb_lines_hh measures a country’s diffusion of first-generation (copper and coax) broadband 
connections and services and, therefore, it directly captures the replacement effect and is expected to 
exert a negative impact on NGA adoption on average. The variable cable measures the share of 
broadband coax lines run by cable entrants, which represent the main intramodal competitors of the 
incumbent´s broadband DSL services. Because we can directly control for the relevant (intramodal) 
replacement effect, fms solely reflects the escape competition and Schumpeterian effect.  
                                                     
14
  As a consequence, we do not have to rely on broadly defined indices, dummy-based scorecards or other 
proxies, which are commonly used in the related literature but hardly related to fixed broadband wholesale 
access regulations (such as the OECD regulatory index for the telecoms sector). The “Polynomics 
Regulation Index 2012” (Zenhäusern et al. 2012) is the most related to the EU regulatory framework, but it 
is available only up to 2010 and captures only the formal aspects of regulation and not its effectiveness. 
However, certain access regulations imposed by NRAs might exist on paper for years without any real effect 
on the relevant markets. In contrast, our measure incorporates the actual market effectiveness of ex ante 
regulations by linking these to the corresponding market outcomes (the same argument in favour of 
effectivity-based measures can be found in Bacache et al. (2012) or Briglauer et al. (2013)). 
[14] 
5.2.3 Prices 
As outlined in sections 4.1 and 4.2, the net impact of regulation and competition on NGA adoption is 
apriori undetermined, since regulatory-induced service-based competition influences prices and thus 
adoption on the demand side but it also negatively affects NGA investment on the supply side, which 
decreases NGA adoption. Likewise, a high level of infrastructure-based competition brings down 
broadband prices but, beyond a certain level, also deteriorates NGA investment. In order to isolate the 
direct supply-side effects of the competition and regulation variables, one has to account for the 
market outcome that is related to first-generation competition by controlling for the average broadband 
price level, price_bb. The net impact of the variable price_bb on NGA adoption is determined by the 
following effects: (i) in the case that first- and second-generation broadband services are substitutes, 
an increase in price_bb shifts demand and increases NGA adoption; (ii) to the extent that price_bb 
stands as a proxy for NGA prices, an increase in price_bb will decrease NGA adoption alongside the 
demand curve (own-price effect); (iii) if price_bb stands as a proxy for a general broadband price level 
that reflects the supply determinants, such as the number of intramodal competitors and first-
generation network topology or the extent of public broadband subsidies, a decrease in price_bb 
increases NGA adoption due to more favourable market conditions. Also, a lower broadband price 
level increases the customer base that might eventually be migrated to NGA services and hence 
increases NGA adoption. Since the definition and the quality characteristics of the broadband price 
variable, price_bb, are distinctively different from representative NGA services, we assume that the 
effects in (iii) dominate the other effects and thus expect a negative sign of price_bb. 
5.2.4 Cost controls 
We use the following measures for the demographic and topographic cost factors: Whereas urban_pop 
reflects different cost structures due to varying shares of rural and densely populated areas, hh_dens 
represents a country’s average household size and therefore a measure of the housing structure. The 
yearly number of building permissions of multiple dwelling units, mdw, provides another measure of 
household structure. 
[15] 
We use the following measures for NGA construction costs: whereas lab_cost represents an annual 
labour cost index, lab_cost_ICT gives an annual labour cost index that is related to ICT industries and 
wage measures manufacturing costs per hour. 
5.2.5 Demand controls 
The total telecommunications revenues normalized to households, telco_rev_hh, act as a proxy for the 
ICT market size and, thus, for the overall willingness to pay for broadband/NGA services in a country. 
GDP_pc_pp measures income effects. Furthermore, we include the variable iday, which provides the 
share of the population that uses the Internet frequently, to cover NGA-relevant consumer tastes. The 
number of Internet users per capita, int_user_pc, represents another proxy for the overall ICT affinity 
within a country. The educational level, edu, is measured as the percentage of the adult population that 
has completed at least upper-secondary education.  
Network effects are considered by adding the lagged dependent variable, Fttx_hh(t-1), as a right-hand-
side variable to the empirical specification. Fttx_hh(t-1) measures the installed subscriber base and thus 
the aggregate demand in the previous period. 
6 Empirical specification 
We employ a two-fold empirical specification strategy: In section 6.1 we first specify a simplified 
static reduced-form model which enables comparative static analysis. The latter appears to be of prime 
importance for policy makers and in view of the first two research questions. In section 6.2 we more 
realistically consider a market which is not in equilibrium and explicitly account for an endogenous 
adoption process which primarily addresses the third research question. 
6.1 The “static” adoption model 
As can be inferred from the literature review in section 2, some studies focus on broadband 
penetration, i.e. demand, while others focus on investment, i.e., the supply of broadband/NGA 
connections. Only a few empirical studies explicitly identify broadband/NGA supply and/or demand 
or outline the underlying reduced-form approach. Our static baseline specification refers to a reduced-
form model in which demand is expressed in terms of NGA household adoption (in logs), 
[16] 
ln(FTTx_hh).
15
 Imposing the equilibrium condition (demand = supply) eliminates the endogenous 
NGA-related price variable and yields the following econometric reduced-form specification:
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Equation (1) depends on the main variables of interest, i.e., regulation and competition, in state i in 
year t, as well as on a vector of demand and cost controls (Zi(t-1)). Note that Zi(t-1) also contains a 
measure of the average broadband price level, price_bb, which explicitly controls for the competitive 
outcome in first-generation broadband markets, allowing the estimation of the direct supply-side effect 
of regulation and competition. εit represents the additive error term and θi country-specific effects. 
Equation (1) includes lagged values of all the exogenous variables.
17
  
6.2 The “dynamic” diffusion model 
Any adoption process is inherently dynamic, most notably, due to network effects or consumer inertia. 
The vast majority of the related empirical literature finds that (ICT) adoption processes are best 
described through S-shaped (logistic or Gompertz) functional curves that represent different versions 
of an exponential growth model, which ultimately converges to a certain saturation level.
18
 However, 
even in fibre-leading European countries, the NGA adoption processes are still in their early phase and 
far from being close to the inflection points. In particular, one can infer from Figure A.1 that almost all 
the EU27 states are far from the adoption target defined in the EC’s Digital Agenda. Therefore, NGA 
adoption can be approximated by a simple exponential growth model which relates NGA adoption (in 
logs), ln(FTTx_hhit), to a linear time trend, [t], which is added to equation (1).  
                                                     
15
  A log transformation helps to stabilize the series of our dependent variable. In order to formally test for 
stationarity, we perform “Im–Pesaran–Shin” and “Fisher-type” unit-roots tests which are designed for 
unbalanced panels. Including fixed effects (and time trends), these tests rejected the null hypothesis that all 
panels contain unit roots for all the variables used in our static (and dynamic) model specifications.  
16
  For similar static broadband adoption specifications see inter alia Bouckaert et al. (2010), Cava-Ferreruela 
and Alabau-Munoz (2006), Distaso et al. (2006) or Wallsten and Hausladen (2009). 
17
  With an insufficient number of observations one would run the risk of overfitting the data. The lagged 
specification in equation (1) allows the full employment of the available panel data set.  
18
  For recent and ICT-related diffusion studies see e.g. Grajek and Kretschmer (2009), Czernich et al. (2011) or 
Lee et al. (2011).  
[17] 
Equation (2) below represents another dynamic extension of the baseline specification in equation (1) 
in which the lagged dependent variable, ln(FTTx_hhi(t-1)), is included as a right-hand side variable 
(instead of the linear time trend, t). The coefficient α1 allows to measure the importance of network 
effects that give rise to an endogenous adoption process if 0 < α1 < 1. (1 - α1) measures the constant 
“speed of diffusion”, λ, which comes from a Gompertz model of adoption (Kiiski and Pohjola 2002, 
pp. 299–300). λ is expressed as the percentage of the gap between the long-run (desired or target) 
stock of NGA subscribers and the subscribers in the previous period that is closed each period (Kiiski 
and Pohjola 2002; Andres et al. 2010).
19,20
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6.3 Identification 
The desire to measure causation and to avoid endogeneity in spite of the reliance on non-experimental 
data is the key concern in empirical economics (Wooldridge 2002, p. 421; Cameron and Trivedi 2005, 
p. 715). We argue, first of all, that endogeneity in the form of reverse causality is effectively 
eliminated as we assess the impact of demand- and supply-side determinants related to first-generation 
broadband markets on emerging second-generation NGA markets; hence, we can hardly imagine that 
the current NGA adoption influences, for instance, the previous regulation on broadband markets that 
was implemented by NRAs typically many years ago. However, this line of reasoning might not be as 
compelling in view of all the other explanatory variables. Therefore, we also perform standard 
Granger causality tests (Granger, 1969) to reinforce the above argumentation on statistical grounds. 
The results, which are reported in Table A.3 in the Annex, indeed indicate that there is no bidirectional 
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  Let Fttx_hhit
*
 denote the desired long-run stock of NGA subscribers; then, the Gompertz model of diffusion 
specifies the rate of change as    )__(ln(_/1/_ )1(
*
 tiititit hhFttxhhFttxhhFttxthhFttx  . 
20
  For the sake of clarity, we drop the cross-sectional index in the remainder of the paper. Again all exogenous 
right-hand side variables are lagged for the reason given in footnote17. Moreover, assuming that adoption 
decisions at a particular point in time do not depend on contemporaneous but on the last period’s conditions 
makes also sense in view of the dynamic specification in equation (2), as consumers’ adoption process will 
typically be related to switching costs, which might become reinforced in the case when long-term retail 
broadband contracts exist. 
[18] 
causality. Second, we control for potential endogeneity due to unobserved and time-invariant 
heterogeneity by including fixed effects (θi) at the country level. Third, by lagging the explanatory 
variables, NGA adoption is related to pre-determined values of the independent variables. Whereas 
lagging explanatory variables only mitigates endogeneity problems due to time-variant heterogeneity 
in the static model (equation (1)), pre-determinedness, or sequential exogeneity, is reasonable for 
dynamic panel models such as the diffusion model in equation (2) (Wooldridge 2002, pp. 299-300). 
7 Empirical results21 
Table 1 shows the main results using fixed-effects (“FE”) regressions to estimate our static 
specification in equation (1).
22
 Regression (1) reports the FE estimates for the model specification that 
contains all the demand and cost controls (“Full”) as described in sections 5.2.4 and 5.2.5. The F-test 
(F_θ) following regression (1) shows that country-level FEs are significant, implying that pooled OLS 
would produce inconsistent estimates if the FEs are correlated with the independent variables. 
Regression (1) reports t-statistics assuming that the errors in equation (1) are i.i.d., which might induce 
misleading inference as well. Therefore, one has to control for both serial correlation and any arbitrary 
form of heteroskedasticity by calculating robust standard errors. For short panels (T ≤ 8 in our case), 
this strategy is preferred to modelling a specific error correlation structure (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, 
p. 725). Regression (2) contains FE estimates for the full model based on robust standard errors 
(“rob”). Note, however, that robust standard errors still assume that there is no contemporaneous 
correlation across the panel units. Typically, spatial dependence is unlikely to exist at the country level 
with short time series. However, Pesaran’s test of cross-sectional independence does not provide 
unambiguous evidence for all the “final” FE models in Table 1 and Table 2. Regression (5) therefore 
reports the “Driscoll–Kraay” standard errors (“DK”), which are assumed to be heteroskedastic, 
                                                     
21
  STATA 12.1 is used to estimate the regressions. 
22
  FE specifications are clearly preferable to random effects in view of our observational data set. 
Conceptually, our analysis focuses on the EU27 member states, which represent a particular set of rather 
homogenous countries and cannot be considered as a random sample drawn from the population of all 
countries. Empirically, a heteroskedastic- and cluster-robust Hausman test strongly rejects the random 
effects model (the Sargan–Hansen test statistic is 71.025) on the grounds that the RE estimates will be 
inconsistent. 
[19] 
autocorrelated up to some lag and possibly correlated between the panels (Driscoll and Kraay 1998; 
Hoechle 2007). 
In regressions (3) to (5), we eliminate all except the significant demand controls (int_user_pc(t-1), edu(t-
1)) and the least insignificant cost controls (wage(t-1), urban(t-1)). As it can be seen, the basic structure of 
the coefficients for the main variables remains effectively unchanged throughout regressions (1) to (5), 
which reassures us that those estimates are largely robust to alternative selections of control variables. 
The demand controls int_user_pc(t-1) and edu(t-1) are statistically significant with the expected signs and 
appear to capture ICT affinity and e-literacy best, respectively, as essential preconditions for the usage 
of high-speed broadband services. The cost controls wage(t-1) and urban(t-1) are insignificant and the 
latter variable also has an unexpected sign in regressions (1) and (2). Whereas insignificant cost 
estimates appear to be primarily due to country FEs (low within variation), the unexpected sign of 
urban(t-1) might be attributed to two opposing effects. First, in densely populated areas, NGA 
deployment can serve more customers at the same time, thus reducing the costs for a single fibre 
connection (economies of density). Second, however, the total digging costs are much higher in urban 
areas, where construction activities become more labour-intensive. We therefore include the 
interaction term urban*wage(t-1) in regressions (3) to (5) to capture this relationship. Indeed, urban(t-1) 
then shows the expected sign and its impact on NGA adoption decreases with increases in the wage 
level, wage(t-1), in regressions (3) to (5). 
Overall, we refer to regressions (3) to (5) as final regressions (“Final”) as these are the most efficient 
specifications. When comparing regression (3) with regression (5), one finds that imposing “Driscoll–
Kraay” standard errors substantially increases the significance levels. However, as the estimator is 
based on an asymptotic theory, we have to consider the results with caution in view of our short panel 
and thus treat the estimation results of model “Final_FE_rob” in regression (3) as the preferred ones. 
Regarding the main variables of interest, one first finds a significant and non-linear relationship with 
respect to our infrastructure-based competition variable, fms(t-1) and fms
2
(t-1), for all the FE regressions. 
The maximum of the non-linear relationship informs us about the optimal competitive market 
conditions for NGA adoption. For instance, one can infer from the corresponding coefficient estimate 
[20] 
that a share of ~17.2% and 19.5% of fixed landlines is optimal in regression (3) in Table 1 and 
regression (6) in Table 2 (including the time trend), respectively. The grand mean of fms(t-1) is ~26.88% 
and thus above this optimal value, which means that the escape competition effect still dominates the 
Schumpeterian effect and fixed-to-mobile substitution has exerted a positive impact on NGA adoption 
in the past. However, increasing competition from mobile networks brought the average value of this 
variable close to its optimum during the analysis period with )2004(fms  = 0.3317 and )2011(fms  = 
0.2314.
23
  
The coefficient of the variable bb_lines_hh(t-1) is negative and significant in regressions (1), (2) and (5) 
but not in regression (3) which provides unclear evidence as regards the replacement effect. In 
regression (4) we therefore examine the replacement effect in greater detail by testing potentially 
relevant interaction effects. As the replacement effects refers to both DSL and cable connections, we 
first test whether there is a differential effect with respect to these forms of intramodal competition by 
including an additional interaction term, bb_lines*cable(t-1), in regression (4) in Table 1. As the 
corresponding coefficient is insignificant (as well as the coefficient of the main effect, cable(t-1)), we 
conclude that there is no differential impact and the replacement effect comes equally from both types 
of fixed broadband infrastructure. This result appears to be reasonable in view of the rather similar 
quality and price characteristics of intramodal coax and copper/DSL broadband retail services. Second, 
the replacement effect might be subject to a differential effect with respect to extent of broadband 
infrastructure in the individual member states. Most notably, one can safely assume that the lack of 
well established first generation broadband infrastructure in Eastern European transition economies 
pushed migration towards NGA services in those countries and simultaneously opened up an 
opportunity for operators to directly deploy NGA infrastructure at much lower opportunity cost 
(Briglauer and Gugler 2013). And, in fact, regression (4) shows that the coefficient of bb_lines_hh(t-1) 
is now significant as well as the interaction term bb_lines_hh*Eastern(t-1). Moreover, the negative 
marginal effect of the first generation broadband for the average European member state is more than 
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  It is interesting to contrast this result with the finding of Briglauer et al. (2013), who measure mobile 
competition in a different way (based on survey data for the years from 2005 to 2010) but also find that 
competition stemming from mobile networks has increased but is well below its optimum value on average.  
[21] 
offset, if we control for the group of Eastern European member states. This implies that the 
replacement effect is of relevance only in the non-Eastern European Union member states which 
typically exhibit well-established first generation broadband infrastructure. 
Finally, we find a coefficient of the regulatory variable, reg_bb(t-1), which is estimated in the quite 
narrow range of -2.4050 to -2.4512 for all the FE regressions in Table 1 and significantly negative 
throughout all the estimations (including those in Table 2). This strongly supports our hypothesis 
outlined in section 4.1 that the more effective access regulation is, the more negative is the impact on 
the adoption of NGA services. The average estimate of the coefficient of reg_bb(t-1) (~ -2.42) in 
regressions (1) to (5) implies that an increase in regulatory intensity of 10 percentage points leads to a 
decrease in NGA adoption of 21.49% ([=exp(-2.42*0.1)-1]*100). Evaluated at the grand mean, which 
represents the average EU27 member state, this implies an average decrease from 0.05147 to ~0.04041 
NGA lines per household.  
The average broadband price variable, price_bb(t-1), is negative and significant in all FE regressions 
from which we infer that the price variable mainly stands proxy for a general broadband price level as 
presumed in section 5.2.3. If we drop price_bb(t-1) from the regressions, the coefficient of reg_bb(t-1) 
increases throughout in absolute terms (e.g., from ~-2.405 to ~-2.535 in regression (3)), which shows 
that the price effect is opposed to the negative effect of regulation on NGA investment. However, since 
this increase is not substantial, we infer that the negative direct impact of regulation on supply-side 
investment activities dominates the price effect on the demand side.  
(Table 1 about here) 
Table 2 contains the estimation results of the dynamic specification for the “final” diffusion models. 
Regression (6) first reports the results for the exponential growth model that includes a linear time 
trend, t. As expected the coefficient is positive, indicating diffusion effects, and significant at the 10% 
level. Overall, the other coefficient estimates are not changed substantially when compared with the 
“final” specifications of the static adoption model in Table 1. We also estimate regression (6) as two-
way FEs by including year dummies instead of the linear time trend. However, the year dummies are 
jointly insignificant (the F-statistic is 0.92; not reported in Table 2) and hence their inclusion would 
[22] 
result in less efficient estimates. Regression (7) shows that the coefficient estimates remain virtually 
unchanged if we normalize our dependent variable with respect to the total population (“pop”) instead 
of the total number of households.
24
  
Regression (8) includes the lagged dependent variable, ln(Fttx_hh(t-1)), as an additional regressor in 
order to control for endogenous growth in terms of network effects. Estimating regression (8) by 
means of an ordinary FE estimator would yield inconsistent and biased results, since the lagged 
dependent variable and the error terms would be correlated (Nickell 1981). The usual way to work 
around this source of endogeneity is applying GMM estimators. However, a weakness of GMM 
estimators is that their properties only hold for a large number of cross-sectional units (n ≤ 27 in our 
case). Monte Carlo evidence supports the LSDVC estimator, which proves to be (much) more efficient 
than various instrumental variable-type estimators when n is small (Kiviet 1995). Bruno (2005a,b) 
developed a bias-corrected LSDV estimator (“LSDVC”) for unbalanced panel data. Although the basic 
structure of the LSDVC estimation results in regression (8) is still similar to that of the previous 
regressions, the focus here is on the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable, ln(Fttx_hh(t-1)), which 
is highly significant and substantial (α1 = 0.7056). This gives us an initial indication of the relevance 
of the network effects underlying. However, a high value of α1 is not necessarily due to true state 
dependency as it might be also the result of correlation with unobserved heterogeneity (θi) or error 
dynamics in a static model. Fortunately, it can be shown that OLS and FE estimators are likely to be 
biased in opposite directions in autoregressive models (Bond 2002). Whereas OLS leads to upward 
biased estimates of α1, since the values of the lagged dependent variable are positively correlated with 
the omitted country fixed effects, FE estimates are downward biased for small T. Hence, if the 
dynamic model in equation (2) is correctly specified, the true estimate of α1 capturing state 
dependency is between OLS and FE estimates. And, in fact, comparing the respective coefficient 
estimates in regressions (8) to (10), one can infer that the LSDVC estimate for α1 lies nicely within the 
interval [0.5682; 0.7800]. Even if we refer to the lower bound, we can thus safely conclude that a 
causal mechanism via the last period and hence substantial network effects exist which autonomously 
push the adoption of new ICT services, as outlined in section 4.4. The speed of diffusion (λ = 1 - 
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  The same result holds for the static adoption models in Table 1 (results are available upon request). 
[23] 
0.7056) suggests that it will take around 6.5 years to close 90% of the gap between the average 
number of NGA connections per household (0.05147) and the Digital Agenda’s target value (0.5). 
Also, note that speed of diffusion is significantly greater than zero for all values of λ[0.5682; 
0.7800], which confirms that migration to NGA services is indeed subject to some non-negligible 
switching costs on the side of the consumers.
25
 
(Table 2 about here) 
8 Summary and final remarks 
This work identifies the effects of sector-specific ex ante regulation and infrastructure competition on 
the adoption of NGA services in Europe using a static and dynamic model specification with recent 
panel data from the EU27 member states. As opposed to the related literature, the econometric 
specification explicitly addresses the endogeneity problem mainly by relating NGA adoption to 
regulation and competition in preceding broadband markets.  
The results indicate firstly that NGA adoption is negatively influenced by the extent and effectiveness 
of the wholesale broadband access regulation that is imposed on the incumbent’s first-generation DSL 
infrastructure. Also, it should be pointed out that the impact of regulation is quite substantial. 
Accordingly, the goals of the EC’s Digital Agenda seem to be at odds with the sector-specific EU 
regulatory framework, which intends to expand strict cost-based access regulation to the emerging 
NGA infrastructure and corresponding NGA wholesale access services. Realizing the targets of the EC 
to reach 50% adoption with 100 Mbit/s high-speed Internet connections by 2020 becomes much more 
unlikely if the prime importance is attached to high-cost FTTH/B deployment scenarios (Briglauer and 
Gugler 2013). Secondly, competition stemming from mobile networks affects NGA adoption in a non-
linear way, as expected. With respect to the time frame of our analysis, the positive impact of the 
escape competition effect dominates the Schumpeterian effect. Thirdly, we also found evidence of a 
replacement effect underlying the first-generation broadband infrastructure, which appears to be of 
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  This is also confirmed by a recent survey of the European Commission (2012, p. 60) which shows that a 
majority of EU citizens are not willing to switch to high-speed broadband services due to (i) lack of 
awareness of potential benefits, (ii) lack of experience with new services and (iii) expected price level of 
NGA services. 
[24] 
particular relevance in the “old” EU member states with well established infrastructure and might 
become even reinforced in the future in view of the potential of new DSL and coax technologies. 
Finally, our dynamic specification suggests that substantial network effects give rise to an endogenous 
NGA adoption process. As this process exhibits high growth potential, the adoption target of the EC 
appears to be still feasible time wise, if one refers to a broad NGA definition and if NGA adoption is 
not endangered by shocks on the demand or supply side or by wrong policy incentives.  
It should be noted once again that the intention of this paper is neither to identify the demand or 
supply related to NGA adoption and deployment, respectively, which is a task of future research. In 
view of the dynamic interaction of supply and demand, a proverbial chicken-and-egg situation gives 
rise to a coordination problem: it is not clear a priori whether there has to be demand for new, 
attractive and bandwidth-hungry services in advance in order to enforce the deployment of new 
communications infrastructure or whether those services and applications will automatically evolve 
after the necessary infrastructure has been put in place. Internet history indicates that the development 
of content and applications usually follows infrastructure deployment, e.g. there would be none of the 
Web 2.0 services and social platforms available in a world with narrowband dial-up Internet 
infrastructure. This view suggests that the goals of the EC’s Digital Agenda can be reached best if 
NGA deployment is primarily driven by the supply side, either by means of US-like deregulatory 
approaches or via favorable competitive market conditions, as indicated by our results and the vast 
majority of the previous and broadband-related literature.  
[25] 
Table 1: Estimation results for the adoption model (dep. var.: ln(Fttx_hhit)) 
Regression (nr.) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Full_FE Full_FE_ 
rob 
Final_FE_ 
rob 
Final_FE_ 
rob_i 
Final_FE_ 
DK 
reg_bb(t-1) -2.4439
***
 -2.4439
***
 -2.4050
**
 -2.4512
**
 -2.4050
***
 
 (-3.42) (-2.95) (-2.48) (-2.34) (-3.65) 
price_bb(t-1) -0.0312
**
 -0.0312
*
 -0.0333
*
 -0.0309 -0.0333
***
 
 (-2.60) (-1.92) (-2.00) (-1.67) (-8.93) 
fms(t-1) 46.3133
***
 46.3133
*
 37.1846
*
 45.9448
**
 37.1846
***
 
 (3.56) (2.05) (1.99) (2.13) (3.88) 
fms
2
(t-1) -118.522
***
 -118.5224
**
 -107.9046
**
 -120.9295
**
 -107.904
***
 
 (-4.78) (-2.55) (-2.61) (-2.63) (-5.37) 
bb_lines_hh(t-1) -4.7610
**
 -4.7610
**
 -1.6642 -2.5625
**
 -1.6642
*
 
 (-2.51) (-2.26) (-1.55) (-2.06) (-1.88) 
int_user_pc(t-1) 4.7430 4.7430 6.0861
**
 4.9290
*
 6.0861
***
 
 (1.38) (1.36) (2.46) (1.93) (3.50) 
edu(t-1) 0.2390
***
 0.2390
***
 0.2133
**
 0.2683
***
 0.2133
***
 
 (3.24) (3.52) (2.72) (3.37) (2.83) 
telco_rev_hh(t-1) -153.2427 -153.2427    
 (-0.39) (-0.23)    
i_iday(t-1) 4.8560 4.8560    
 (1.37) (0.82)    
gdp_pc_ppp(t-1) 0.0001 0.0001    
 (0.86) (1.25)    
hh_dens(t-1) 2.7844 2.7844    
 (0.80) (0.71)    
labcost_ict(t-1) 0.0111 0.0111    
 (0.59) (0.58)    
labcost(t-1) 0.0089 0.0089    
 (0.68) (0.69)    
wage(t-1) -0.1896 -0.1896 0.8247  0.8247 
 (-1.09) (-1.19) (1.02)  (1.46) 
urban(t-1) -0.2842 -0.2842 0.1573  0.1573 
 (-1.23) (-0.98) (0.38)  (0.58) 
mdw(t-1) -0.0016 -0.0016    
 (-0.49) (-0.38)    
urban*wage(t-1)   -0.0123  -0.0123 
   (-1.11)  (-1.70) 
bb_lines*cable(t-1)    -1.3457  
    (-0.11)  
cable(t-1)    0.9451  
    (0.08)  
bb_lines*Easterm(t-1)    3.1124
*
  
    (1.99)  
      
[26] 
Constant -13.2967 -13.2967 -32.4730 -27.6838
***
 -32.4730
*
 
 (-0.65) (-0.51) (-1.16) (-4.48) (-2.06) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.658 0.713 0.715 0.714  
R
2
_o 0.0520 0.0520 0.0900 0.1865  
R
2
_w 0.7399 0.7399 0.7315 0.7310 0.7315 
F 23.1167 48.0826 24.9222 29.6084 17728.08 
F_θ 8.4553     
RMSE 0.9561 0.8756 0.8781 0.8695  
Observations 172 172 175 174 175 
Regressions (1) to (5) include country-specific fixed effects (FE), which are not reported. The t-statistics in 
parentheses are based on panel robust standard errors in regressions (2) to (5). Indeed, a Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation indicates that there is first-order autocorrelation in the data. Likewise, a Wald test for groupwise 
heteroskedasticity clearly rejects the null hypothesis of a constant variance. Regression (5) employs “Driscoll–
Kraay” standard errors (“DK”), whereby the autocorrelation structure has a lag length of 
m(T)=floor[4(T/100)^(2/9)], which turned out to be robust to alternative lag specifications.  
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01.   
[27] 
Table 2: Estimation results for the “Final” diffusion model (dep. var.: ln(Fttx_hhit)) 
Regression nr. (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
 Final_FE 
_rob_t 
Final_FE 
_rob_pop_t 
Final_ 
LSDVC 
Final_LDV 
_rob 
Final_OLS 
_rob 
lnFttx_hh(t-1)   0.7056
***
 0.5682
***
 0.7800
***
 
   (8.82) (6.60) (10.58) 
reg_bb(t-1) -2.3515
***
 -2.3608
***
 -2.1195
***
 -2.1849
**
 -0.9706 
 (-2.99) (-2.99) (-2.83) (-2.47) (-1.71) 
price_bb(t-1) -0.0270 -0.0274 -0.0243
***
 -0.0262
**
 -0.0167
*
 
 (-1.58) (-1.60) (-2.70) (-2.37) (-1.84) 
fms(t-1) 45.0935
**
 44.9592
**
 18.0557
*
 19.8921
*
 2.5754 
 (2.27) (2.26) (1.90) (1.98) (0.38) 
fms
2
(t-1) -115.5386
**
 -115.5528
**
 -39.9050
**
 -47.8787
*
 -3.9925 
 (-2.75) (-2.73) (-2.08) (-1.95) (-0.32) 
bb_lines_hh(t-1) -4.9070
*
 -4.9498
*
 -1.0464 -1.1389 0.3124 
 (-1.99) (-2.01) (-0.72) (-1.27) (0.48) 
int_user_pc(t-1) 5.1423
**
 5.0215
**
 2.0246 3.3042
**
 0.1498 
 (2.14) (2.11) (0.91) (2.65) (0.18) 
edu(t-1) 0.1577
**
 0.1581
**
 0.0338 0.0608 0.0044 
 (2.22) (2.22) (0.50) (0.95) (0.34) 
urban(t-1) 0.1094 0.1164 -0.0107 -0.0334 -0.0194 
 (0.31) (0.33) (-0.04) (-0.12) (-1.65) 
wage(t-1) 0.9914 1.0140 -0.0699 -0.1204 -0.0873 
 (1.40) (1.43) (-0.11) (-0.20) (-1.49) 
urban*wage(t-1) -0.0161 -0.0164 0.0002 0.0005 0.0011
*
 
 (-1.57) (-1.60) (0.02) (0.05) (1.74) 
t 0.4268
*
 0.4325
*
    
 (1.71) (1.73)    
Constant -25.0351 -26.3051  -4.0605 0.6330 
 (-1.07) (-1.12)  (-0.25) (0.39) 
Adjusted R
2
 0.731 0.732  0.817 0.884 
R
2
_o 0.0226 0.0173  0.5627  
R
2
_w 0.7482 0.7493  0.8296  
F 26.5819 26.7343  83.5753 134.2713 
RMSE 0.8530 0.8532  0.6550 0.7938 
Observations 175 175 162 162 162 
The t-statistics in parentheses are based on panel robust standard errors in regressions (6) to (7) and (9) to (10). 
The LSDVC standard errors in regression (8) are bootstrapped based on 100 iterations with bias correction 
initialized by the Arellano and Bond estimator for estimates up to order O(1/T). 
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01.   
[28] 
Annex 
Figure A.1: NGA household adoption levels for FTTx and FTTH/B technologies in the EU27 
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Horizontal reference line at 0.5 indicates target value of the EC´s Digital Agenda.
Source: FTTH Council Europe. Fttx and FttH/B household adoption levels are (essentially) zero in MT (CY).
As data for Luxembourg is available only for 2009 onwards and due to its exceptionally high FTTx adoption level, Luxemborug is not included in Figure A.1.
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Table A.1: Variable description and sources 
Variable 
(expected sign) 
Description Source* 
 Dependent variable(s)  
FTTx connections 
per household, 
Fttx_hh 
(Fttx_pop) 
Number of households connected by FTTx 
technologies normalized to a country’s total number 
of households  
(normalized to total population) 
©FTTH Council 
Europe
(a)
 
 Main explanatory variables  
Extent of 
broadband access 
regulation, 
reg_bb (-) 
Share of regulated lines (local loop unbundling, 
bitstream, resale) to total retail broadband lines 
(minus cable entrant lines) 
EU Progress Report
(b)
 
Broadband price, 
price_bb (?/-) 
Average monthly cost of capped/uncapped residential 
fixed broadband for 1 Mbps–10 Mbps in euros 
excluding VAT. Tariffs are a weighted average of 
representative stand-alone products of incumbent and 
entrant operators whose accumulative subscribers are 
over 90% of each country’s total broadband market 
©Quantum-Web 
Limited
(c)
 
Broadband lines, 
bb_lines_hh (-) 
Number of total retail broadband lines (DSL and 
coax) as a share of the total number of subscribed 
households  
EU Progress Report 
©EUROMONITOR 
(households) 
Fixed-to-mobile 
substitution, 
fms (+(levels) 
- (squared term)) 
Share of the total number of fixed landlines to the 
total number of fixed lines and mobile subscribers. 
Mobile-cellular telephone subscriptions include the 
number of postpaid subscriptions and the number of 
active prepaid accounts (which have been used 
during the last three months). They exclude 
subscriptions via data cards or USB modems. Fixed-
landlines refer to the number of active lines 
connecting subscribers’ terminal equipment to the 
PSTN 
ITU
(d)
 
Cable lines, 
cable (?) 
Number of total retail broadband cable lines run by 
entrants as a share of the total retail broadband lines 
EU Progress Report 
 
 Control variables  
Education, 
edu (+) 
Percentage of the adult population (25–64 years old) 
that has completed at least upper-secondary 
education 
EUROSTAT
(e)
 
GDP per capita, 
gdp_pc_ppp (+) 
GDP per capita and PPP adjusted in current US$ World Bank
(f)
 
Average revenue, 
telco_rev_hh (+) 
Total telecommunications revenues in mn US$ per 
household with constant 2011 prices and fixed 2011 
exchange rates 
©EUROMONITOR
(g)
 
Heavy Internet 
users, 
i_iday (+) 
Share of the population using Internet services every 
or almost every day 
EUROSTAT/ 
COCOM
(h)
 
  
[30] 
Table A.1: Variable description and sources (cont`d) 
Variable 
(expected sign) 
Description Source* 
Household density, 
hh_dens (+) 
Average number of household members, expressed as 
a share of a country’s population in its total number 
of households 
©EUROMONITOR 
(households) 
EUROSTAT 
(population) 
Internet users, 
int_user_pc (+) 
Internet users per capita ©EUROMONITOR 
ICT labour cost 
index,  
labcost_ICT (-) 
Annual ICT labour cost index normalized to 100 in 
2008  
EUROSTAT 
Labour cost index, 
labcost (-) 
Annual labour cost index normalized to 100 in 2005 © EIU
(i)
 
Multiple dwellings,  
mdw (+) 
Annual building permits – number of two and more 
dwellings normalized to 100 in 2005 
EUROSTAT 
Wage per hour, 
wage (-) 
Wage per hour manufacturing in US$ with constant 
2011 prices, fixed 2011 exchange rates 
© EIU 
Urban population, 
urban (+) 
Urban population as a percentage of the total 
population 
©EIU 
Eastern European,  
Eastern  
Dummy variable equal to 1 if country is BG, CZ, EE, 
HU, LT, LV, PL, RO, SL or SK 
 
* Note that some sources are commercially available only (©), while others are publicly available. (a) FTTH 
Council Europe is a non-profit industry organization, the aim of which is to enforce the deployment of fibre-
optic technology in Europe. Data are collected by IDATE (www.idate.org) through desk research, direct contact 
with FTTx players, information exchange with FTTH Council Europe members and from IDATE partners. Data 
from June 2005 to June 2011 and December 2011 (= 2012) are available to its members at: 
http://www.ftthcouncil.eu/resources?category_id=6. Data for Bulgaria and Luxembourg are available only for 
2009 onwards. There are no data for Malta and the number of subscribers for Cyprus is de facto time-constant 
and essentially null (with one rise from 100 to 120 FTTx lines). (b) The EU “Progress Report on the Single 
European Electronic Communications Market” for data from 2004 to 2011 is available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/policy/ecomm/library/communications_reports/index_en.htm. There are 
missing values for Bulgaria and Romania for the years from 2004 to 2006. (c) Data are based on a quarterly 
monitoring service that harvests over 2000 fixed broadband tariffs across 100 countries. A few missing values for 
the variable price_bb had to be linearly interpolated. (d) The ITU World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators 
Database is available at: http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/. (e) Data are available at: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/information_society/data/database. There are a few missing 
values for the variables iday, which had to be linearly interpolated. (f) The World Bank’s “World Development 
Indicators” are available at: http://data.worldbank.org. (g) The Euromonitor International database is available at: 
http://www.euromonitor.com/. The number of households in 2012 was set equal to the number in 2011. (h) Data 
collected by EC services, through NRAs, for the Communications Committee (COCOM). (i) The Economist 
Intelligence Unit country database is available at: https://eiu.bvdep.com/frame.html.  
[31] 
Table A.2: Summary statistics 
Variable Variation Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs* 
Fttx_hh overall 0.0514702 0.1047494 3.77E-06 0.8574688 N = 191 
Fttx_pop overall 0.0212465 0.0406438 1.52E-06 0.3171702 N = 191 
reg_bb overall 0.2435517 0.2218102 0 0.9947678 N = 210 
price_bb overall 29.76357 15.75987 5.26 99.89 N = 226 
fms overall 0.2688139 0.0746535 0.1076148 0.437505 N = 216 
edu overall 68.26574 13.96395 26 86.1 N = 216 
gdp_pc_ppp overall 29405.69 13476.8 8730.804 89055.8 N = 216 
telco_rev_hh overall 0.0023742 0.0010328 0.0004868 0.0046744 N = 216 
i_iday overall 0.4021399 0.1808903 0.036 0.8039 N = 216 
bb_lines_hh overall 0.4201162 0.2130044 0.0069897 0.8752053 N = 210 
cable overall 0.0898561 0.0843489 0 0.377342 N = 209 
hh_dens overall 2.507075 0.2827785 1.999367 3.204768 N = 243 
int_user_pc overall 0.6064277 0.1844711 0.1500006 0.9325179 N = 216 
labcost_ICT overall 96.27037 13.70907 47.7 165.1 N = 216 
labcost overall 112.0291 21.62619 81.4439 226.7329 N = 213 
mdw overall 89.98745 46.11853 9.96 344.11 N = 216 
wage overall 16.00741 11.13623 1.6 51.4 N = 216 
urban overall 72.08326 11.79625 48.6801 97.4358 N = 216 
t overall 5 2.587318 1 9 N = 243 
  
[32] 
Table A.3: Direct Granger causality tests with LSDVC* 
Regression nr.: (A.1) (A.2) (A.3) (A.4) (A.5) 
Dependent var.: logFttx_hh reg_bb price_bb fms bb_lines_hh 
Independent var.:      
Lag 1: lnFttx_hh 0.7599
***
 0.0172 -0.2171 0.0005 0.0063 
 (7.02) (1.34) (-0.21) (0.37) (1.34) 
Lag 2: lnFttx_hh -0.2251
**
 -0.0103 1.2378 0.0004 0.0008 
 (-2.20) (-0.77) (1.25) (0.26) (0.18) 
Lag 1: reg_bb -1.4602
*
 0.2077
*
 -4.6318 -0.0231
*
 -0.0136 
 (-1.66) (1.75) (-0.48) (-1.88) (-0.33) 
Lag 2: reg_bb -0.7297 0.1999
**
 -4.6678 -0.0046 0.0324 
 (-0.69) (2.24) (-0.49) (-0.32) (0.66) 
Lag 1: price_bb -0.0213
*
 -0.0002 0.5096
***
 0.0000 -0.0008 
 (-1.75) (-0.14) (3.97) (0.03) (-1.30) 
Lag 2: price_bb -0.0115 -0.0004 0.0173 0.0001 0.0007 
 (-1.11) (-0.23) (0.15) (0.60) (1.23) 
Lag 1: fms -3.7719 2.9152 174.1643 1.2292
***
 0.1384 
 (-0.14) (0.77) (0.54) (13.39) (0.10) 
Lag 2: fms 4.6910 -3.9993 22.2926 -0.6351
***
 0.8075 
 (0.17) (-1.06) (0.07) (-3.14) (0.62) 
Lag 1: fms
2
 19.7170 -10.3231 -380.4769 -0.9275
***
 1.0401 
 (0.33) (-1.28) (-0.58) (-3.44) (0.37) 
Lag 2: fms
2
 -16.0605 12.9332
*
 -12.0118 1.0089
**
 -1.9191 
 (-0.29) (1.69) (-0.02) (2.39) (-0.75) 
Lag 1: bb_lines_hh -1.8601 -0.3531 -73.4958
**
 0.0739 0.7056
***
 
 (-0.61) (-0.82) (-2.40) (1.47) (8.71) 
Lag 2: bb_lines_hh 0.6942 0.3409 34.6634 -0.0503 -0.0292 
 (0.28) (1.02) (1.41) (-1.44) (-0.33) 
Lag 1: int_user_pc 4.0283 0.2643 6.8033 0.0575 0.1564 
 (1.28) (0.61) (0.22) (1.14) (1.04) 
Lag 2: int_user_pc 0.4455 0.3211 17.2223 -0.0460 0.1075 
 (0.15) (0.77) (0.59) (-0.98) (0.77) 
Lag 1: edu 0.0157 0.0040 -1.9402
*
 -0.0029
*
 0.0004 
 (0.15) (0.26) (-1.73) (-1.80) (0.07) 
Lag 2: edu 0.0168 -0.0290
***
 1.0222 -0.0012 0.0025 
 (0.20) (-2.63) (1.08) (-0.84) (0.57) 
Lag 1: urban -0.0962 -0.2081 12.1685 -0.0299 0.0124 
 (-0.05) (-0.86) (0.62) (-0.96) (0.16) 
Lag 2: urban -0.1714 0.1179 -7.9139 0.0358 -0.0115 
 (-0.09) (0.47) (-0.40) (1.09) (-0.14) 
Lag 1: wage -0.0932 0.0391 -4.4858
**
 -0.0000 -0.0168
**
 
 (-0.46) (1.45) (-2.30) (-0.01) (-1.97) 
Lag 2: wage -0.5508 -0.3073
**
 7.5938 0.0001 0.0360 
 (-0.66) (-2.44) (0.96) (0.00) (1.00) 
Lag 1: urban*wage 0.0087 0.0045
***
 -0.0465 -0.0000 -0.0003 
 (0.77) (2.61) (-0.43) (-0.03) (-0.57) 
Lag 2: urban*wage 0.0004 -0.0009
**
 -0.0262 -0.0001
**
 0.0001 
 (0.15) (-2.40) (-0.94) (-2.00) (0.56) 
  
[33] 
Granger causality tests with p-values of χ2-tests of joint significance of coefficients displayed 
in bold in regressions (A.1) to (A.5): 
Prob > χ2 (Lag 2) 0.0373** 0.3927 0.4437 0.8613 0.2300 
Observations 126 126 125 127 126 
Prob > χ2 (Lag 3) 0.0154** 0.8718 0.9641 0.7171 0.2836 
Observations 111 112 111 112 112 
* Since Granger causality tests require inclusion of lagged dependent variables, we had to use the LSDVC 
specification (regression (8) in Table 2). In order to test for reverse causality we used all variables of the “final” 
specification in regression (8). Predetermined explanatory variables are dated t-2 or earlier. The lower part of 
Table A.3 shows the p-values for the Granger χ2-test once for inclusion of two lags and once for inclusion of 
three lags (corresponding coefficient estimates and t-statistics for the latter case are not reported in Table A.3). In 
regression (A.1) causation is established, since the coefficients of the independent variables (in bold) are jointly 
significant (Prob > χ2(Lag 2) = 0.0373) in line with our baseline specifications in equations (1) and (2). For 
regressions (A.2) to (A.5) the Granger causality χ2-statistics are insignificant for both Lag 2 and Lag 3, 
suggesting that there are, as expected, no reverse causality patterns. t-statistics in parentheses, LSDVC standard 
errors in regression (A.1) to (A.5) are bootstrapped based on 100 iterations.  
*
 p < 0.10, 
**
 p < 0.05, 
***
 p < 0.01 
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